as well as to events in their personal lives. Americans were less happy in 2010 than in 2006; the percent "very happy" decreased by four percentage points and the percent "not too happy" increased almost as much. In the cross section, standard predictors -including church attendance, family income, and marital status -continued to matter. Looking from the dynamic perspective of the panel study, though, we see that job loss and changing family incomes mattered far more. Changes in marital status were also important for changing morale; marrying made people happier while divorcing made them unhappy. The subjective sense that finances were improving mediated a significant portion of the income-happiness association. The effects of unemployment and marriage are estimated in a way that supports the inference that finding a job or a mate actually causes happiness to increase.
to his observation that people in two-adult households were happier than those in other living arrangements.
While robust correlations abound, evidence of causal impacts for income, marriage, religion, and the like is scarce. Causal inference from observational data is always difficult (Morgan and Winship 2007) . Three puzzles highlight how it is particularly difficult in the happiness research.
The first puzzle, known as the "Easterlin Paradox," concerns income. Richard Easterlin (1995) questioned whether a rise in income could actually cause a rise in happiness. He observed that the average American was about as happy in the early 1990s as in the 1960s even though the nation grew far richer in that period. He asked why the robust correlations between family incomes and personal happiness over many decades yielded no change in aggregate happiness. Something was interfering with the salutary effects of affluence. Easterlin's conjecture was that people adapted to prevailing conditions quickly, raising their expectations as incomes rose. Relatively affluent people were relatively happy, but the money itself was not procuring happiness. Since then others have noticed that with enough data -obtained by compiling time series from many countries -it is possible to find a nondecreasing but nonlinear relationship between national income and average happiness, efficiently shown by plotting incomes on a ratio scale (Kahneman and Deaton 2011) . Fischer (2007) also noted that while GDP per capita rose fairly consistently in the United States during the period discussed by Easterlin and since, wages did not. He finds that aggregate happiness correlates quite well (r = 0.45) with hourly wages in U.S. data spanning 1973-2004. The second puzzle concerns heterogeneity. Some people have unobserved and maybe even unobservable attributes that make inference difficult. We need controls for that kind of heterogeneity, from following people over time (as we do here) or matching them as in twin studies (Kohler et al. 2005) . There can also be heterogeneity in effects. The same event or thing might make some people happy and others unhappy. Free cigarettes might raise a smoker's happiness but induce unhappiness in the non-smokers around her. Hout and Greeley (2012) discuss heterogeneity in relation to religion. Religious people presumably find comfort in their beliefs about cosmology, life, death, and eternity and enjoy participating in religious activities. According to Hout and Greeley (2012) , stronger belief and more frequent activity makes the religiously prone happy and shields them from the sadness associated with death and disaster. Those tendencies among the "treated"
should not, however, lead us to infer that inducing religious identification in the secular or impos-ing church attendance on the lapsed would make them any happier. It might even make them less happy. (Hout and Cumberworth 2012) . In other research, Hout and Hastings (2012) found significant changes in the way people answered questions about racial and gender stereotypes between 2006 and 2010, which they suggested might be attributed to the ways in which the prominence of Barack Obama's and Hilary Clinton's campaigns affected people's attitudes about race and gender. Here we expect the recession to be the greater factor but will consider partisanship and race as well.
Statistical models and analytic strategy
The strength of a panel study like the GSS panel comes from the answers people give to the same questions at different times. The over-time variation in individuals' answers allows us to statistically control for unchanging personal characteristics that we cannot or do not measure, increasing the chance that our statistical estimates represent quantities of interest. Formally, we specify that a person's answer to a question, say the happiness question, depends on his or her attributes, some of which vary over time and some of which do not:
where i(= 1, . . . , N ) indexes people, j(= 1, . . . , J) indexes the covariates that differ among people and over time, k(= 1, . . . , K) indexes covariates that differ among people but not over time, 2006, 2008, 2010 ) indexes time, the ν i are unobserved attributes of people that do not vary over time, and it are unobserved attributes of people that vary over time (including errors of measurement).
In conventional survey data we cannot separate observables that vary over time, the Xs, from observables that do not, the Zs, or the accumulated unobservables that vary over time, it , from the accumulated unobservables that do not, ν i , so there is just one vector of covariates and one error term. In that formulation, the errors are assumed to be independent of the Xs and Zs so that any covariance between y and an X or y and a Z can be apportioned among the βs and γs.
With multiple observations of each case, the distinctions between Xs and Zs become visible, allowing researchers to separate them and to separate it from ν i (Halaby 2004) . But, according to Morgan and Winship (2007, Ch. 9) , more is required. Controlling for observed and unobserved factors is necessary but not sufficient. A researcher must also control for the possibility that selection affects the time trend, that is, that treated and control groups would have different time trends over the duration of the panel, even if no treatment occurred. In addition to being intrinsically different from the kind of people who are never treated, the kind of people who select themselves into treatment might be more different from never-treated people at one time compared with another.
Thus we approach these data as Morgan and Winship recommend. In fact, our statistical model, spelled out below, extends their equation 9.30 to competing treatments while retaining the key features of their approach, especially the specification that the ever-treated might be on a different time-trend than the controls are on. In this way we give ourselves the best chance of estimating the quantities of interest -how much happier treated people are, on average, than they would be in the absence of the treatment. These alternative specifications imply the same substantive conclusions we reached based on the results we report here.
Past research has identified socioeconomic status (SES), family composition, and religion as important factors in this kind of general happiness (e.g., Hout and Greeley 2012) .
Unemployment is the aspect of SES of greatest interest in the context of a panel spanning the Great Recession. We use a dummy variable coded one for the unemployed and zero for all others (including those out of the labor force). This is not a standard variable in prior studies.
In the context of the Great Recession, though, we felt that this direct, personal experience of the recession was a key treatment to consider. Note in interpreting the results that we are comparing the unemployed to all other persons, not just to the employed. Unemployment statistics, for example, exclude people who are not in the labor force from calculations. We do not do that here because selecting on being in the labor force is an additional choice that might complicate our analysis.
Exploratory analyses showed that adding additional labor force treatments such as being retired or a student did not alter these results in any notable way. Thus we focus on this binary treatment.
Per the Morgan and Winship approach, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether the person was unemployed at any of the three waves of the panel and interact that selection variable with the time trend.
We use a standard family income measure as an additional SES indicator. Throughout the panel family income was measured in 25 categories. Respondents were shown a card with the 25 categories printed out and asked "In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year before taxes, that is?" We combined the eight categories for brackets below $10,000, scored it ten, coded categories nine through twenty-four to their midpoint (in thousands of dollars), and scored the open category according to the Pareto formula as modified in Hout (2008) ). We used the consumer price index for urban residents research series (CPI-URS) to adjust the incomes to 2010 prices. A peculiarity of GSS income measures is that they contain substantial differentiation at very low incomes and much less higher up the income scale.
Exploratory analysis indicated that the relationship between income and happiness followed logged incomes better than incomes themselves for amounts higher than $10,000 per year. Variation below $10,000 per year was more or less random (see Appendix Figure 1 ). So we use the log of family income (in thousands of dollars standardized to 2010 prices) in our analyses, modified to code everyone with a family income below $10,000 to the natural logarithm of ten.
Although having a religion is the treatment of greatest interest, Hout and Greeley (2012) showed that, in the cross-section, attendance at religious services completely mediated all the association between denominational affiliations and happiness, so we supplement the analysis of religion with the GSS attendance scale (from zero for "never" to eight for "more than once a week"), recoded to the probability of attending religious services in the last seven days, as our religion indicator (see Appendix Figure 2 for evidence that this is the appropriate functional form).
In the Morgan and Winship scheme, it is obvious who the "ever treated" by religion group is and who the controls are when having a religion or not is the contrast of interest. When we shift to attendance, we consider those who attended "2-3 times a month" in at least one panel as ever-treated and those who never attended at least that often as controls.
We use a dummy variable for being married as a competing treatment. The married are often found to be happier than others. Preliminary analyses with more detail about marital status and children in various age categories yielded insignificant improvements to the fit of the model. Per the Morgan and Winship approach, we also include a dummy variable indicating whether the person was married at any of the three waves of the panel.
Finally we considered a novel hypothesis that in these partisan times the election of Barack Obama as president in 2008 (after the 2008 interviews were all complete) made Democrats happier and Republicans less happy. To that end we added the GSS party identification variable which scales people from strong Democrats (scored zero) to strong Republicans (scored six). We considered two alternative scorings as well. The first combined strong and not strong partisans so the scale just ran from one to five; the second was a set of dummy variables contrasting everyone to strong Democrats. We got null results for every specification we tried. Apparently the election was too light as a treatment to register in personal happiness 15-22 months later. The null results prompt us to drop party identification from the analyses we report below because including it removes 94 cases from the analysis -the 74 people that mentioned a party other than Democratic or Republican and 20 people who did not answer the question about political party.
All models contain statistical controls for gender, racial ancestry (blacks and latinos distin- 
Extending the Morgan and Winship model
The Morgan-Winship approach is designed to yield a regression coefficient for treatment of interest that estimates without bias the expected value of the difference between the outcome with and
Usual regression approaches come closer to estimating the difference between the expected value under treatment and the expected value in the absence of
, only under very special circumstances (see Morgan and Winship 2007, pp. 42-50) . Thus, special adaptations of the regression model are necessary if the goal of the analysis is an
To begin, suppose we have data on a sample of individuals (i) observed at selected times (t).
The individuals are divided into the controls who will not receive treatment (or receive a placebo) and the treatment group who will receive treatment at some time. That distinction applies to all t, even before the treatment occurs, and is measured as a time-invariant binary variable D * i that is one for the treatment group (even before they are treated) and zero for the controls. 2 The models works because including a main effect for D * i controls for selection at the outset, and the interaction between D * i and T allows the linear trend to differ for controls and the treated. In a three-wave panel like the GSS, time is discrete. In this context, it seems reasonable to relax the linearity assumption and allow the change between waves 1 and 2 to differ from the change between waves 2 and 3 as well as differing between controls and treated.
Morgan and Winship developed this model for a one-time treatment, with time divisible into pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. In their scheme everyone starts out untreated and, once treated, remains treated; treatment is an irreversible feature of the research design. In panel data with socially selected treatments such as being out of work or married, treatment is not part of the research design; it is an observation. Observing that D it = 1 at t = 1 does not imply that D it = 1 at t = 2, nor can we assume that D it = 0 for all i at t = 0 as Morgan and Winship do. We extend their model to handle the fact that we do not administer the treatment; we observe it.
Another important difference in observational data is the presence of competing treatments.
For each treatment of interest, we have to consider separate time trends among the treated and controls. We handle that with interactions between treatment and time.
Incorporating all these adjustments to the three-wave panel and multiple treatments, our model takes the form:
where the X ijt are the treatment variables (j = 1,2,3) 3 , the X * ijt mark the treatment groups, the Z kit (k = 1, . . . , K) are the control variables (time-varying or constant), P anel t denotes which wave of the panel, the βs are the treatment effects, the κs are the selection effects, the γs statistically adjust for the control variables, the τ s are the residual or overall time-trends, the κ s adjust the 2 The linear extrapolation for the treated creates the counterfactual after D it switches from zero to one. 3 Note that j indexed time-varying covariates in equation (1); it indexes treatments in equation (3). counterfactual time trends for the treatment groups, the νs are time-invariant between-person random effects (uncorrelated with the Xs, Zs, Ds, D * s, and s), and the s are within-person random effects (uncorrelated with the Xs, Zs, Ds, D * s, and νs).
We use maximum likelihood random effects regression to estimate the parameters in equation (3) -the βs, κs, γs, τ s, and κ s as well as the standard deviations of the νs and s. Fixed effect regressions dropping the Zs yielded estimates of the βs and κs that did not differ significantly from the random-effects estimates we report below, indicating that the Morgan-Winship approach performs well, even in the presence of competing treatments. Table 2 ). The Great Recession or some other event between 2006 and 2010 reduced Americans' general happiness.
Descriptive results
People were fairly consistent in their degree of happiness; 63 percent gave the same answer in the reinterview as they gave two years earlier, 23 percent switched from very happy to pretty happy or vice versa, 11 percent switched from pretty happy to not too happy or vice versa, and only 3 percent switched between the extremes. Changes vary by initial happiness in ways that suggest modest unreliability combined with real downward drift in the population to produce these patterns. Fifty-four percent of people who were initially very happy reported they were very happy two years later; 40 percent were pretty happy; and 6 percent were not too happy. Among people who were initially pretty happy, almost three-fourths were also pretty happy two years later; those 
Causes of happiness
We begin by replicating common results to verify that the novel findings in the panel data are due to the analytical leverage that the panel gives us and not to some peculiarity in the GSS panel sample. Our results, labeled "cross-sectional" in Table 3 , confirm that happiness patterns among people in the GSS panel are not unusual. Married and affluent people were happier than unmarried and low-income people. We have two novel findings: out-of-work people were less happy than others and general happiness declined from 2006 to 2010 as the recession hit and its consequences persisted. The control variables -gender, racial ancestry, education, and age -were also significant. Somewhat surprisingly, religious people were not significantly happier than people with no religion.
Cross-sectional patterns, no matter how suggestive, can be suspect. Unobserved factors correlated with the independent variables and happiness could, by their absence, leave the impression that observed factors are more important than they really are. In particular, actually changing some variable by one unit may result in less than aβ yx change in happiness. As noted above, the repeated measures in panel data advance the potential to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, at least unobserved heterogeneity that does not vary over time. In particular, we use repeated observations to identify those people who ever experienced a treatment -those who reported they were married, out-of-work, or attended religious services at least monthly in at least one of the three interviews. Those people have selected themselves into treatment. By controlling for that fact and for the differing time trends people like that might have, we can remove much of the selection and otherwise unobserved variation that could bias cross-sectional estimates (Morgan and Winship 2007, ch. 9) .
Two sets of estimates are Table 3 , in the columns marked "baseline" and "attendance." The baseline estimates take having a religion as our measure of religious treatment; the attendance estimates use the frequency of attending religious services as the measure. Estimates of socioeconomic and demographic effects are nearly the same regardless of how we measure religiosity.
The choice matters for our conclusion about religion, though. Religious identity is not significant; attendance is.
Our first treatment of interest is being out of work. Experiencing the deleterious effects of the Great Recession directly reduced happiness by a quarter point. A quarter point is large in absolute terms and about 40 percent of the standard deviation of the happiness score (0.63). We can hardly be surprised that losing a job is hard on a person's morale. What is surprising is how close the causal estimate is to the cross-sectional estimate. Selection into unemployment -the many factors that might predispose the kind of people at risk of being laid off to unhappiness --accounts for only one-sixth of the cross-sectional estimate. Unemployment directly reduces happiness. Marriage is our second treatment of interest. Long considered an important factor in people's happiness (Waite and Gallagher 2000) , it is also among the factors most subject to selection bias.
That is, it seems reasonable to think that, all else being equal, the kinds of people who would be happier if they were married would be the most likely people to get married. Indeed that is somewhat the case. We estimate that marriage increases happiness by 0.18 points -an estimate only three-fourths as large as the cross-sectional estimate and not large enough to offset the negative effect of unemployment. Furthermore, the selection effect is almost as large (β = 0.14; s.e. =0.05) so concern on this front is very well placed. Finally the negative time trend, lacking among the controls, is significant among ever-married people. So counterfactually the kinds of people who get married were significantly less happy being unmarried during the recession than the controls were.
Our third treatment of interest is religion. The risk of selection bias in estimating the difference between religious and secular happiness is as high as with marriage. That is, the kinds of people who could be happy in a religious setting are far more likely to respond positively to religion than the kinds of people who are unlikely to be religious (Hout and Greeley 2012) .
Merely identifying as having a religion is not sufficient to make a person happier. Surprisingly this is less due to a strong selection into religion than to other controls in the model. Attendance, on the other hand, is important for happiness. Replacing identification with attendance at religious services yields a significant estimate (β = 0.09; s.e. =0.04). Increasing attendance from never to weekly would raise happiness by .08 -the equivalent of raising one-twelfth of those who are unhappy or only pretty happy up one notch on the happiness ladder.
Money makes people happier. The estimates for family income are positive and significant in the cross-sectional, baseline, and attendance models. The magnitudes can be difficult to grasp. A one-point increase in the natural logarithm of family income increases happiness by 0.05 or 0.06.
From the base of the income measure at $10 thousand (2.3 on the log scale), a one-point increase on the log scale corresponds to an increase in family income to $27 thousand, a two-point increase on the log scale corresponds to an increase to $73 thousand, and a three-point increase on the log scale corresponds to an increase to $200 thousand. Finding a job or a spouse would increase happiness more than boosting income from $10 to $200 thousand. Yet the increase is, nonetheless, significant, even after controlling for selection and time-invariant unobservables. As an aid to interpretation we present expected general happiness across the range of family incomes for each model considered so far and one more to be discussed later (see Figure 1) . 5 Expected general happiness ranges from 1.08 to 1.26 under the baseline and attendance models. These estimates imply that the increase in happiness from the poorest to most affluent Americans is about three times larger than the drop for all Americans between 2006 and 2010. Most of the increase occurs in the range up to $60 or $70 thousand; the rate of increase slows but does not reverse beyond that.
Said another way, about two-thirds of the increase in happiness occurs in the lower one-third of the range.
6
The relative income hypothesis
Despite the robust positive correlations between income and happiness, it seems unlikely to most scholars that money literally buys happiness. The Easterlin (1995) paradox and other issues suggest that relative income might be more pertinent for happiness than absolute income (Brady 2004; Firebaugh and Schroeder 2009) . The relative income hypothesis is that people compare themselves to people like them. If they have more money than people like themselves, they feel better and report marginally more happiness than otherwise similar people do.
The test for the relative income hypothesis, as specified by Brady (2004) is a comparison of the coefficients for personal and comparison incomes. If people's happiness depends on their income compared to others', then the two coefficients will be equal in absolute value but opposite in sign when income is log-scaled. Brady derives the test from the fact that the logarithm of a ratio equals the difference between the logarithms of the numerator and denominator of the ratio, that is, ln(a/b) = ln(a) − ln(b). Thus if
(where X it is personal income,X it is the comparison income, and Z it is all the other covariates) is the correct equation, but we estimate
then we will not be able to reject the null hypothesis β * = β 1 = −β 2 .
ness (1.17). 6 That lower one-third of the income range encompasses 70 percent of respondents.
Uncertainty and controversy enter this literature in trying to define comparison groups with any precision. Aggregations by neighborhood, larger places, age, race, or some combination have all been used in the literature.
Here we consider income relative to place and age, separately. In both we used the standard cross-sectional GSSs from 2004-2010, pooled to assure reasonable sample sizes. For place, we regressed the logarithm of family income (after recoding all incomes below $10,000 to $10,000
to reduce the leverage of extremely low incomes) on dummy variables for gender, racial ancestry, year, and place. 7 From the regression results, we calculated the mean logged family income, adjusted for gender and racial composition, for each of the 79 places. For age, we repeated the procedure replacing place with single years of age to obtain mean logged family income, adjusted for gender and racial composition, for each of the 71 ages in the dataset.
We added each relative income measure to the "attendance" model. The coefficient for the adjusted mean income in the place was significantly less then zero but not significantly different from minus one times the coefficient for personal income. In Brady's (2004) scheme that is a positive result for the relative income hypothesis. The results are in the last two columns of Table   3 .
Intervening variables Davis (1984) and others have emphasized the importance of short-term changes in income -what Davis called "new money" -as the crucial link between income and happiness. Recent income change is also highly relevant to discussions of accommodation, the process by which people get used to having more money after an increase in their income. The panel data give us a unique opportunity to test the "new money" hypothesis. First, the panel design itself allows us to observe people's incomes at two or three times. Second, the context of the Great Recession means that more people than usual saw their incomes fall. In usual economic conditions economic growth and lifecycle increases in income predominate. In the recessionary times of 2006-2010, losses give us additional leverage to gauge the impact of income change on happiness.
7 The sampling frame for the 2002-2010 GSSs included 79 primary sampling units, differentiated (but not identified) in the data file by the variable sampcode. We used sampcode to designate places (see Smith, Marsden, and Hout 2011 for details).
We specified four different "new money" measures: (1) the ratio of the person's inflationadjusted family income in one wave to that in the previous wave (logged), (2) the same calculations without adjusting for inflation, (3) measure (1) divided into five categories, and (4) measure (1) divided into nine categories. None of these measures of the change in family income showed a significant relationship to happiness, controlling for the log of of family income. To illustrate, we include measure (1) in Table 4 as part of the "Income change: actual" model. The estimate is 0.20
(with a standard error of 0.20). Thus when we measure actual changes in family income over a two-year period, we find no evidence that new money matters more than older money.
Davis's analysis was based on a subjective assessment of income change, not on actual income change. The GSS question is "During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?" We scored "better" equal to one, "worse" equal to minus one, and "the same" as zero and added the variable to the attendance model. The results are shown in the "Income change: subjective" model in Table 4 . The estimate is 0.10 (with a standard error of .01). Nearly as important, the income coefficient is now 0.030 (compared to 0.053 in the attendance model), and the out-of-work coefficient is now -. 215 (compared to -.252 in the attendance model). In fact, the income coefficient, while still nearly sixty percent as large as before, is no longer statistically significant. We are not going to remove a core variable from the model, but it is fair to say that a subjective assessment of recent changes in finances mediates much of the effect of income on happiness. Adding a dummy variable for answering "same" does not improve the model's fit, so the linear income change variable is sufficient. This is a substantively important result. Going from "worse" to "better" is a two-point increase,
implying that the feeling that personal finances are improving that much is the equivalent of finding a job. It operates in a causal chain. Having more money or having a job raises happiness both directly and indirectly through the financial optimism captured by this variable. These results are symmetrical, of course, in the sense that feeling that one's personal economic trend has slipped from better to worse is the equivalent of losing a job. And that sense, too, mediates the effects of job loss and income loss.
Having entered the realm of subjective assessments, we consider subjective social class as another potential intervening variable. The GSS includes the classic question "If you were asked to use one of four names for your social class, which would you say you belong in: the lower class, the working class, the middle class, or the upper class?" We scored the answers 0-3 and added this variable to the income change: subjective model. The results are in the "subjective class" column of Table 4 . The coefficient is positive, as expected, but it is neither statistically significant nor effective in mediating the effects of other variables.
We also sought out intervening variables for the relationship between religious attendance and happiness. That search was less successful. We considered the importance of religion in one's life as one potential mediator. And, following Hout and Greeley (2012) , we considered belief in God. Neither added much to the model, and neither explained much of the relationship between religious attendance and happiness.
Conclusions
Happiness and its social correlates have burst from a few scattered papers in the 1970s to a very impressive literature in the past fifteen or so years. Happiness is now an important subject of academic research. Long term trends in general happiness are linked to both economic and religious attributes (Hout and Greeley 2012) . The affluent and the religiously active appear happier in most surveys on the subject. Marriage and children (Kohler et al. 2005) are also important correlates of happiness.
Nearly all evidence to date from the United States considers cross-sectional patterns. We contribute to this literature some evidence from the relatively new GSS panel, spanning 2006 to 2010.
In tracking a representative sample of Americans over time, we can supplement correlations derived from differences among people with evidence on how changes in those attributes correspond to changes in the happiness of the same individuals -all in a context of national economic stress that saw overall happiness decrease.
Jobs were the single most important factor in Americans' happiness during the Great Recession. People who lost their job in the recession reported substantially lower happiness than they would have otherwise. Similarly and symmetrically morale among the lucky ones who found work rebounded. Family incomes supported and supplemented these changes related to being out of work. An increase in family income resulted in modestly greater happiness; a decrease in income resulted in modestly less happiness. The effect is proportional in the sense that an increase in income from $10 to $20 thousand had the same impact as an increase from $20 to $40 thousand or $40 to $80 thousand. The effect of employment was so much greater than that of income, though, that finding a job was the equivalent of increasing income fifteen times over, for example, from $10,000 to $150,000 per year. Few of the unemployed who found jobs after the recession found jobs that good. And if they did their happiness was increased by both, compounding the good news.
The effect of objective income is largely mediated by how people think about the family finances. If they think they are doing better than others in their community or better than they were in the past, they are happier. If they lack one or the other of these assessments, they are less happy.
Attending religious services boosts happiness among the religious. The effect itself is quite modest. Increasing attendance from monthly to weekly would boost happiness by about 0.07 on a scale from zero to two. Yet it is statistically significant and quite robust across alternative specifications (all of which control for the fact that the kind of people who would choose attending are different from those who would not).
Life-partnership through marriage (or living together) was another essential element in happiness. Marrying increased happiness by an amount bigger than doubling family income. Dissolving a marriage reduced it by an equivalent amount.
Women were happier than men. Racial ancestry mattered in that whites and Asians are happier than Latinos. Blacks were happier than Latinos but less so than whites. Finally, we searched for partisan differences linked to the 2008 election and found none. Democrats may have been happier than Republicans on election night, but that was more a mood swing than a change in morale. As important as partisanship has become in American social life, it is not a lasting factor in Americans' morale. 
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